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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The great import of the Rylander case is not found in the definitive
words of the court but rather the impetus it provided the state legisla-
ture. After forty-six years of existence the phrase "was not proximately
caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees" was omitted
in the 1959 statute.33 The section was not otherwise changed. This legis-
lative action is in complete accord with the previous decisions of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court. The question is now absolutely resolved.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 48, S 138.5(b).
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A JUDICIAL REPEAL
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983' and Section 19852 of the Civil Rights Act were originally
enacted in 1871.8 In the years following, they have been the subject of a
great amount of discussion.4 They have been called "a powerful piece of
legislation,"'5 however, recent decisions involving law enforcement offi-
cials have tended to repeal any powerful effect they may have had.
Section 1983 gives a cause of action for denial of due process6 while
142 U.S.C.A. 1 1983 (Supp., 1959) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, sut
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
242 U.S.C.A. 1 1985 (Supp., 1959) provides: "(3) If two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authori-
ties of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection ofthe laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth
in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
8 17 Stat. 13 (1871), "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
4 Consult: Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L.
Rev. 1323 (1952).
5 Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA. 3rd, 1950).
6Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (C.A.7th, 1954), cert. den. 349 US. 940 (1955);
McShone v. Moldovan, 172 F2d 1016 (C.A.6th, 1949); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d
705 (C.A.10th, 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 944 (1948).
COMMENTS
Section 1985 gives a cause of action for denial of equal protection of the
laws, 7 but not for denial of due process."
Section 1983 does not mention conspiracy, while Section 1985 does,
therefore the Act creates a cause of action for conspiracy to deny equal
protection, but not for conspiracy to deny due process. 9
Neither diversity of citizenship, nor amount in controversy are pre-
requisite to federal court jurisdiction of the cause of action asserted un-
der the Civil Rights Act.'0 The right to maintain an action under the Act
is conferred by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
and by statute.1 2 Section 134313 provides jurisdiction for the benefit of a
plaintiff who otherwise cannot meet the requisite amount in controversy
for federal jurisdiction. While most courts have relied on it for jurisdic-
tion, a few courts have entertained an action by basing jurisdiction on
Section 1983 itself.14
SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
Civil proceedings in vindication of civil rights are governed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.' 5 Under these rules the theory of the plain-
tiff in stating his claim is not of utmost importance. 16 The complaint
should not be dismissed on motion of the defendant unless, upon any the-
ory, it appears that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any
state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim. 17
T Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810
(C.A.5th, 1953); McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers of America, 108
F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark., 1952).
8 Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (C.A.Sth, 1955); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709
(C.A.lst, 1954).
9 Mitchell v. Greenberg, 100 F.2d 184 (C.C.A.9th, 1938).
10 Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (C.A.7th, 1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
11 Oppenheimer v. Stillwell, 132 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Cal., 1955).
12 28 U.S.C.A. S 1343 (Supp., 1959); 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (Supp., 1959).
Is 28 U.S.C.A. S 1343 (Supp., 1959) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
14 See Dyer v. Kayuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 227 to 229 (D. Hawaii, 1956); Com-
pare: Kenny v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (C.A.6th, 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 856 (1956) (juris-
diction based on S 1343); with Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (C.A.7th, 1953)
(jurisdiction based on S 1983).
15 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 (Supp., 1959); 2 Moore's
Federal Practice, para. 1.03, p. 14 (2nd ed., 1959).
16 Driggers v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, 219 F.2d 292 (C.A.Sth,
1955).
'7 Des Isles v. Evans, 200 F.2d 614 (C.A.Sth, 1952).
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In recent years, many complaints alleging violations of civil rights by
state law enforcement officers have been dismissed as insufficient.18 The
most recent example of a complaint being dismissed as insufficient is Mon-
roe v. Pape.19 Plaintiff alleged an unreasonable search in the night time,
assault and battery, illegal detention for a ten-hour period, and denial of
counsel during that period. In dismissing the complaint the district court
said that an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers acting under
color of law was not a violation of due process, unless evidence was ob-
tained by the search which might later be used against the plaintiff. 20 In
so holding the court completely misconstrued the rule on unreasonable
searches and seizures as stated in Wolf v. Colorado,21 where although the
court was divided on the issue of the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence in a state prosecution, all nine Justices agreed with Justice
Frankfurter when he stated:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ...
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment . . . is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforce-
able against the States through the Due Process Clause.
22
This position of the Court has been reaffirmed in Irvine v. California23
where two Justices recommended immediate criminal prosecution, under
the Civil Rights Act,24 of the state police officers who perpetrated the il-
legal search and seizure. 25
18 Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (C.A.7th, 1959) (alleging unreasonable search,
assault and battery, illegal detention); Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (C.A.Sth, 1959)
(alleging false arrest and beating by officers acting pursuant to a peace warrant);
Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (C.A.7th, 1959) (alleging false arrest and two hour secret
detention); Curry v. Ragen, 257 F.2d 449 (C.A.Sth, 1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 851
(1958), reh. den. 358 U.S. 914 (1958) (alleging malicious institution of forcible entry
and detainer action by a private citizen. Three policemen acting pursuant to a court
order assisted in ejecting plaintiff from his home); Agnew v. Compton, 239 F.2d 226
(C.A.9th, 1956), cert. den. 353 U.S. 959 (1957) (alleging false arrest); Dineen v. Wil-
liams, 219 F.2d 428 (C.A.9th, 1955) (alleging false arrest and a twenty hour secret de-
tention); Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (C.A.7th, 1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 958
(1955) (alleging unreasonable search, secret detention, beating to obtain a confession);
Gladstone v. Galton, 145 F.2d 742 (C.C.A.9th, 1944) (alleging arrests, searches and
prosecution of plaintiff pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance); Egan v.
Aurora, 174 F. Supp.'794 (N.D. Ill., 1959), aff'd No. 12738 (C.A.7th, 1960) (alleging
false arrest of a political speaker); Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. S.C.,
1957) (alleging unreasonable search and seizure, secret detention and brutality).
19 272 F.2d 365 (C.A.7th, 1959).
20 Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Dismiss Complaint, 59 C 329 (N.D. Ill.,
1959).
21338 U.S. 25 (1949). 22 Ibid., at 27, 28. 21347 U.S. 128 (1954).
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (Supp., 1959) (The criminal counterpart of § 1983).
25 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1953); See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723
(App.D.C., 1958); United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (C.A.2d, 1957); Jones v. United
COMMENTS
In Stefonelli v. Minard'2 1 although refusing to enjoin the introduction
of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in a state court
proceeding, the Court stated: "[U]nder the very section now envoked
[Section 1985(3)], we have withheld relief in equity even when recog-
nizing that comparable facts would create a cause of action for dam-
ages." 27
Nonetheless the court in Monroe relied on Mackay v. Chandler28 and
Jennings v. Nester.29 Mackay treated the unreasonable search in the fol-
lowing manner:
The exemption from unreasonable searches and seizures is not one of the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States which the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids the state to abridge, nor is it an element of due
process of law guaranteed by the latter amendment against state action.30
Jennings held that since the defendant had been retried and the whole
record indicated a fair trial, the plaintiff had been accorded due process
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' This position is irreconcila-
ble with both the history of unreasonable searches3 2 and with the holding
of the Supreme Court in Wolf. In fact, such decisions have led writers to
state that: ". . . Wolf's intermediate finding signifies little if anything.
. . .-33 "It would seem that the practical effect of the Wolf case is virtu-
ally to leave for local determination, unimpeded by federal judicial su-
pervision, the matter of making effective a federal guarantee of a basic
constitutional immunity." 34 "The net effect of the Wolf decision was the
recognition of a basic constitutional right without any corresponding
remedies, a privilege without substance, an immunity without force." 35
States, 217 F.2d 381 (C.A.8th, 1954); Brown v. United States, 204 F.2d 247 (C.A.6th,
1953); Matter of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal., 1957); Collins v. Webb, 133 F.
Supp. 877 (N.D. Cal., 1955).
26342 U.S. 117 (1951).
27 Ibid., at 122.
28 152 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. S.C., 1957), criticised 10 Stanford L. Rev. 347 (1958).
29217 F.2d 153 (C.A.7th, 1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 958 (1955), criticised 103 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 1088 (1955).
30 152 F. Supp. 579, 582 (W.D. S.C., 1957) (emphasis supplied).
31 217 F.2d 153, (C.A.7th, 1954) cert. den. 349 U.S. 958 (1955).
32 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
33 Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083, 1109 (1959).
34 Allen, The Wolf case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1950).
35 Handler, The Fourth Amendment, Federalism and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8
Syracuse L. Rev. 166, 178 (1957).
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However, the Wolf court did provide a remedy for unreasonable
searches and seizures:
[T]he exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect
those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found.
We cannot therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand
such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the
remedies of private action. .... 86
This remedy is the Civil Rights Act. Justice Learned Hand indicated
that in order to show a cause of action, the plaintiff need only show a vio-
lation by state officers of a privilege secured by federal law.8 7 Therefore
since Wolf holds that freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
is a right protected against state abridgement by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Monroe court has compounded the er-
rors of Mackey and Jennings by saying that it is not such a right. The
court of appeals did not even mention Wolf in affirming the district
court, thus it would seem that on the basis of Monroe and Jennings the
Wolf decision has no effect in the Seventh Circuit today.
In direct contrast to Monroe is Davis v. Turner8 where the complaint
alleged that a sheriff and deputy sheriff entered and searched plaintiff's
store without a warrant of any kind, found nothing unlawful, seized
and arrested plaintiff and refused to allow her to consult an attorney,
struck her, put her in jail and refused to tell her the crime of which she
was charged. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the com-
plaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for damages for deprivation
of rights by the sheriff and deputy sheriff acting under color of state
law. Since the allegations in Monroe and Davis are so similar it is very
difficult to determine why one complaint was sufficient and the other
insufficient. The Davis court did not consider each allegation separately,
nor did the Monroe court of appeals. However, the district court
treated each separately (e.g., unreasonable search, battery and detention).
As to the assault and battery the district court held that it must be al-
leged that the battery was for purpose of eliciting information and/or
confessions.8 9 It seems odd that if the plaintiff had confessed as a result
of the beatings his confession would have been ruled inadmissible as a
violation of due process, 40 and yet the district court would hold that
unless the inherently coercive beating produced a confession there would
be no violation. Beatings by law enforcement officers acting in the course
86 338 U.S. 25, 30,31 (1948).
ST Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), cert. den. 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
88 197 F.2d 847 (C.A.Sth, 1952).
89 Transcript of Record on Motion to Dismiss at 13, 59 C 539 (N.D. Ill., 1959).
40 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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of their duties have been held to violate the criminal provisions of the
Civil Rights Act.41 Under Section 1983, it is now well settled that law
officers who do exact confessions by violence can be held civilly liable.42
Although it is not specifically made to appear that the objective of the
defendant deputy sheriff was to obtain a confession in the case of
Dye v. Cox,43 the plaintiff alleged that the deputy sheriff, acting under
color of state law, but without cause, arrested the plaintiff, locked him
in the county jail and kept him there overnight, refusing him an op-
portunity to make bail and beat him while confined to a cell. The court
noted that the alleged behavior of the defendant, if true, deprived the
plaintiff of the right to be free of arrest except on probable cause, and
of his right to bail and to personal safety while in the hands of his
jailor. But in dismissing the action, it was held, that to state a cause
of action under the civil rights statute as the denial of civil rights, the
denial must have been accomplished with the purpose of robbing the
plaintiff of such rights and that the action could not be maintained in the
absence of an allegation of purposefulness on the part of the defendant.
By so holding, the court has created judicial legislation and inserted
the word "wilfully" where it does not expressly exist. The court relied
on Screws v. United States44 where the Criminal Civil Rights Statute45
was construed and Justice Douglas defined intent in this manner:
[T]he specific intent required by the Act is an intent to deprive a person
of a right which has been made specific, either by express terms of the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.... He
who defies a decision interpreting the Constitution knows precisely what he is
doing.46
Thus the Dye court created an intent where it does not exist in the
civil section and also made the intent greater than that expressed in
Screws.
CONCLUSION
Thus, it appears, that there exists in the Seventh Circuit a right without
a remedy. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to provide a
41 United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (C.A.8th, 1956); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (C.A.5th, 1954); United
States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (C.A.Sth, 1953); Gowdy v. United States, 207 F.2d 730
(C.A.9th, 1953); Clark v. United States, 193 F.2d 294 (C.A.Sth, 1951); Koehler v.
United States, 189 F.2d 711 (C.A.5th, 1951).
42 Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (C.A.7th, 1953).
43 125 F. Supp. 714 (D.C. Va., 1954).
44 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
45 Note 24, Supra.
46 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104, 105 (1945) (emphasis supplied).
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remedy for private persons against state officials who deprived them of
due process. However, the courts have indulged in mental gymnastics to
deprive such persons of a congressionally enacted remedy. There exists
the curious situation that a plaintiff may prepare a sufficient complaint
in the Fifth Circuit, 47 if he alleges an unreasonable search and seizure,
but upon the same facts he cannot prepare a sufficient complaint in the
Seventh Circuit.48 The Fourth Circuit requires a wilful intent greater
than that required under the criminal counterpart of the civil action.
49
This situation certainly does not create an impression of uniform en-
forcement of federal legislation.
The Seventh Circuit has consistently pointed out that the plaintiff is
not without remedy in the state courts. 50 However, this is not the prob-
lem at issue. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out that the existence of a
state remedy under the same facts would not be a bar to the suit under
the Civil Rights Act.51 At best, the situation is in a state of great confusion.
As this paper is being written, Monroe is under petition for a writ of
certiorari. 52 If certiorari is granted Justice Frankfurter will finally have
the opportunity to completely clarify the intermediate finding in Wolf,
and give the district courts a concrete guide to determine the sufficiency
of complaints under the Civil Rights Act.
47 Davis v. Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (C.A.5th, 1952).
48Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (C.A.7th, 1959); Jennings v. Nester 217 F.2d 153
(C.A.7th, 1954)), cert. den. 349 U.S. 958 (1955).
49 Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va., 1954).
5OEgan v. Aurora, No. 12738 (C.A.7th, 1960); Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (C.A.7th,
1959); Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (C.A.7th, 1954).
51 Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (C.A.9th, 1955); See United States v. Raines,
-- U.S. -- , 28 Law Week 4147 (1960).
5228 Law Week 3247 (February 17, 1960) (Docket No. 712).
"CAVEAT MANUFACTURER": ADVERTISEMENTS
AS CONSTITUTING EXPRESS WARRANTIES
"Caveat manufacturer" may relegate the revered "caveat emptor" saw
to legal limbo if the holding in a recent case receives approval. The im-
plications of the Cobb v. American Motors Corp.' decision to big manu-
1 19th Judicial District Court, Louisiana, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 63,643,
Division C (June 10, 1959), appeal pending Supreme Court of Louisiana. It will be
noted that the Cobb case is the holding of a Louisiana court of first instance; it is being
appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, where it probably will be heard at some
time late this year. Since the case is unreported and was orally argued without briefs,
there is very little written data of an official nature available. Thanks chiefly, however,
to an article in Advertising Age (see text and n. 2, infra), and materials furnished by
the plaintiff, including his "Trial Memorandum," and notes taken by him and his
counsel concerning the judge's reasoning for the decision, the writer was able to com-
